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CHAPTER 9: BUSINESS ETHICS, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
 
IAN SOMERVILLE 
 
CHAPTER AIMS 
This chapter introduces the reader to the conceptual and practical issues raised by the key ethical 
doctrines which have influenced debates in the field of business ethics and which have consequently had 
an impact on public relations theory and practice. Attention is focused on the significance of these 
theories in relation to corporate social responsibility. The chapter goes on to discuss the arguments for 
and against corporate social responsibility and places these perspectives in the broader context of debates 
surrounding business, society and ethics. Finally, with reference to an illustrative case study, the chapter 
discusses how ethical concepts and the language used to express them relate to the actual practice of 
corporate social responsibility.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 What is ethics? Anyone looking for a simple definition of „ethics‟ will search long and hard to 
find it in a text on moral philosophy or business ethics. The term is derived from the classical Greek 
ethos meaning „customs‟i and thus it may sometimes be taken to refer to the conventions or standards 
which a particular group or community acts upon. But this descriptive definition of ethics, while it may 
be useful to historians and anthropologists, does not equate with the kind of normative thinking which we 
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usually consider to be at the heart of ethical questions (the „what ought I to do in such and such 
circumstances‟ kind of questions). This kind of thinking is summarised by Holmes (1984); „Ethics is 
about the good (that is, what values and virtues we should cultivate) and about the right (that is, what our 
moral duties may be)‟.ii One way to try to answer this question of what ethical behaviour is and what 
ethical action should consist of is to outline a number of different approaches to ethics in the manner set 
out in the next section of this chapter. Dienhart (2000) links this kind of approach to the practical 
question of how to apply ethics in the sphere of business. He notes; „Business ethics focuses on how we 
use and should use traditional ethical views to evaluate how institutions orchestrate human behaviour‟ (p. 
xvi).   
 Public relations discourse in relation to corporate social responsibility has unsurprisingly utilised 
language and concepts derived from the key ethical doctrines - Utilitarianism, Deontology and Rights 
theories - which have dominated ethical debate in the West since the Enlightenment. This leads to 
significant claims for corporate social responsibility programmes. For example, businesses may maintain 
that such activity is the fulfilment of the duties and responsibilities that companies have to the wider 
community, or that they contribute to the common good by benefiting both the company and society. The 
ensuing discussion will explore the nature of the ethical doctrines which business appeals to, the debate 
concerning corporate social responsibility in particular, and how corporate social responsibility is 
justified in practice. 
Business is a social phenomenon. Societies have developed various kinds of social rules, such as 
legal rules, or even the rules of etiquette, which act as a framework or guide to behaviour. Moral rules are 
sometimes regarded as just another set of social rules, but societies are structured around moral rules in a 
peculiarly fundamental way. In fact moral precepts are frequently used to criticise the other kinds of 
social rules which guide human conduct. Most notably there can be clashes between moral rules and legal 
rules. The „race laws‟ in the USA, for example, or the „apartheid laws‟ in South Africa, were eventually 
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perceived to be so immoral that the only moral course was to disobey them. Clearly one may disagree 
with particular moral rules, or question the possibility that „definitive‟ answers to ethical problems are 
possible. Nevertheless it is the case that, in all societies, a great majority of people accept that they should 
adhere to certain fundamental moral rules. Breaking these rules will meet with sanctions of various kinds, 
from disapproval and ostracism to, in certain cases, legal penalties. Moral rules help to structure social 
relations, and many of the decisions that individuals and businesses make must take account of them.  
However behaving ethically in this basic, passive, sense is not normally what is meant by 
corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility involves the idea of business being 
proactive in its relationship with a range of social actors and doing more than just trying to avoid 
breaking moral rules. A key example of corporate social responsibility in practice is corporate 
community involvement (see chapter 12). The term „social responsibility‟ implies that business is 
motivated by more than just self-interest and is, in fact, attempting to promote the collective self-interest 
of society at large. This can be differentiated from, for example, corporate sponsorship where „the 
company‟s managers will expect a tangible return for their money‟ (Varey, 1997, p.118) 
Up until this point we have been using the term „ethical‟ as if it were an unproblematic concept 
about which there is widespread agreement. This is certainly not the case. It is important to clarify some 
of the language and concepts vis-à-vis ethical debate because, as we will see, public relations specialists 
tend to discuss corporate social responsibility using language taken directly from ethical theories. The 
first section in this chapter will discuss several key ethical doctrines which have emerged historically in 
Western philosophy. The next section will relate these ethical theories to debates surrounding whether or 
not social responsibility is desirable at all. The final section will discuss how ethical theories inform the 
language of public relations and impact upon the practice of corporate social responsibility.     
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ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 In ethical theory the first and most profound division is between the assumption that it is possible 
to know moral right from wrong and the denial of that assumption. Cognitivism
iii
 is the term used by 
philosophers to describe the belief that there are objective moral truths which can be known and 
consequently that a statement of moral belief can be true or false. Non-cognitivism is the term used to 
describe the belief that morality is subjective or culturally relative, that is, in regard to moral right and 
wrong there are only beliefs, attitudes and opinions. Cognitivist perspectives such as utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, and Rights theories, have had a significant impact on business ethics and the concept of 
corporate social responsibility in particular, but there have also been attempts to argue that business 
ethics is best seen from a cultural relativist standpoint.
iv
 
 Ethical theories, which argue that it is possible to know right from wrong, can be divided into two 
groups. There are those, like utilitarianism, which assess moral right and wrong in terms of the 
consequences of actions - the consequentionalist perspective - and those, like Kantianism and „rights‟ 
theories, which do not - the non-consequentionalist perspective. From the consequentionalist perspective 
we look at the results of actions in order to make a moral judgement about those actions. From the non-
consequentialist perspective there is no immediate appeal to beneficial or harmful consequences to 
determine whether actions were morally right or wrong.  
 
Utilitarianism 
 The classic consequentionalist theory is utilitarianism which states that actions are not good or 
bad in themselves, but only in so far as what they are good or bad for.
v
 Utilitarianism is the notion that an 
action is right only to the extent that it causes more good than ill to be produced. The classic formulation 
of this position is that of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham identified 
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utility with happiness. Happiness is the only thing desirable as an end in itself and all other things are 
only desirable as a means to the end of happiness. For Bentham therefore, actions are right to the extent 
that they maximise happiness or, at least, mimimise unhappiness.
vi
  It is important to note that Bentham 
was not particularly concerned with the happiness or unhappiness of individuals, for him it is the 
„common good‟ that is the arbiter of right and wrong. This is Bentham‟s greatest happiness principle 
which proposes an action or process can be classified as good when it provides „the greatest happiness 
for the greatest possible number‟.  
 The standard objection to utilitarianism is that it requires the promotion or maximization of 
„goods‟, such as economic growth, in order to achieve utility  and permits the sacrificing of individuals 
and minorities „for the greater good‟. Donaldson (1992) notes that: 
[Utilitarianism] begins with the impeccable principle of „beneficence‟, and ends with the malevolence of the 
Victorian workhouse and the inability to prevent punishment of the innocent, or discriminatory application 
of the law, so that favoured groups are virtually immune, while disfavoured groups pay the price, as tends 
to happen in income policies, and sometimes, in the control of ethnic groups in the labour market (p.129). 
 
It is conceivable that this ethic of welfare may, for example, allow the telling of lies to protect the 
reputation of the corporation and consequently the jobs of employees. So, for example, if a company was 
saved from bankruptcy because its image and reputation were enhanced by lies told by company 
representatives to journalists this may well be seen as a permissible act. From a utilitarian point of view 
the welfare of those human beings whose jobs had been saved is weighed against the breaking of trust 
with other human beings.  
   
An ethic of duty 
 Utilitarianism can be contrasted with the non-consequentionalist ethical position which argues 
that it is motivation rather than consequences which is the determining factor in deciding whether actions 
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are ethical or not. This perspective is generally referred to as deontological, from the Greek word for duty 
(deon), and is a doctrine that is primarily associated with the German philosopher Emmanuel Kant (1724-
1804). Kant argues that ethics is grounded in notions of duty and it follows from this that some actions 
are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences. According to Kant, an act is carried out from a 
sense of duty when it is performed in accordance with what he calls the „categorical imperative‟. Kant 
defines the categorical imperative in two separate but mutually supportive formulations. 
I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will [desire] that my maxim should 
become a universal law. . . . Act in such a way that you always treat humanity . . . never simply as 
a means but always at the same time as an end (Kant, 1964, pp.70-96). 
 
Dienhart (2000) helpfully separates Kants‟s formulations into two versions of the categorical imperative, 
Categorical Imperative: Version 1: An action is only moral if you can make your reason for acting 
into a rule that everyone can follow.  
Categorical Imperative: Version 2: Never use people simply as a means to an end; always treat yourself 
and others as beings with infinite value (p. 117-8). 
 
For Kant „universalising‟ a maxim basically involves ensuring that the principle upon which we act 
should be one which we can recommend everyone else to act upon. The second formulation centres 
ethics on the relationship between human beings. In the case of lying to protect the reputation of the 
company in order to secure jobs, Kant would suggest that you shouldn‟t be prepared to act in this way 
unless you are willing to let everyone to tell lies. Telling lies in order to make someone carry out your 
will also transgresses Kant‟s categorical imperative by treating another human being as merely a means to 
getting what you want. 
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 The chief problem with the deontological doctrine is revealed where there is a clash of categorical 
imperatives. One has a duty never to lie but what if by lying one is fulfilling one‟s duty to prevent the 
murder of another human being? The example that tends to be repeated in philosophy textbooks is what 
do you do when the Nazi interrogators ask you the whereabouts of the Jews you have hidden in your 
basement? Kant actually insisted that if a murderer was to ask you the whereabouts of their intended 
victim you had a duty to tell them and not break the precept regarding lying.
vii
 Therefore even when it 
negatively affects the welfare of other human beings one must fulfil one‟s duty.  
 
An ethic of rights  
 Kant‟s deontological doctrine has much in common with theories which proclaim that there are 
„rights‟ to which every human being is entitled. In both doctrines there is a status common to all human 
beings which affords them protection from abuse by others. To infringe a person‟s human rights is to fail 
to treat them as an end in themselves. Like Kant‟s position, this viewpoint is broadly non-consequentialist 
and rejects utilitarianism. According to these theories we cannot sacrifice individuals and minorities to 
the common good when to do so would be to infringe their human rights.  
Rights theories were developed during the political turmoil of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries by 
radical thinkers who sought to change traditional hierarchical social structures which tended to be held 
together by notions of allegiance to an unelected sovereign. The foundational assumption of „rights‟ 
theories is that over and above mere human law there is an objective moral order, the „natural law‟, which 
sets limits to the power of rulers. In requiring justice of governments, the natural law conferred rights on 
the governed. The generally agreed list was life, liberty, and sometimes, property. These were proclaimed 
as „natural rights‟ bestowed on people by the natural law. They were rights which governments could 
neither grant nor take away, people possessed them by virtue of being human. Governments could rule 
but they were bound „contractually‟ to honour these basic rights.  
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In the writings of the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1714) the „contract‟ became „social‟. 
That is, it was no longer deemed to be a contract between governments and people, but rather between 
the people themselves to set up and empower a government. This is an immensely influential concept and 
has tended to be enshrined in various „declarations‟, from the „American Declaration of Independence‟ to 
Article 1 of the „Universal Declaration of Human Rights‟ which states: „All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights‟.   
Theories which claim that there are inalienable human rights suffer from a similar problem to the 
theory that human beings have duties and responsibilities which they must not disregard under any 
circumstances. What happens when two different „rights‟ clash? In the case of lying to protect the 
reputation of the company and therefore jobs, how does one weigh the „right‟ to work against the „right „ 
of people to be told the truth? 
All of the classic ethical theories have inherent problems and it is fair to conclude that none of 
them seem satisfactory unless they are qualified.  As Chryssides and Kaler (1993) note: „So the aim of 
serving the common good has to be tempered by the admission of rights and responsibilities. Likewise 
rights and duties cannot generally be examined separately and neither can they be pursued regardless of 
any consideration of collective welfare‟ (p.103). 
  
Cultural relativism 
 Before turning our attention to the significance of these debates for corporate social responsibility 
it is important to note that there are perspectives on business ethics which reject the idea - maintained by 
the classic ethical theories - that there are „objective‟ standards of right and wrong. Pearson (1989), in 
embracing the concept of intersubjectivism, offers an argument which places public relations at the centre 
of efforts to construct a business ethic.  For Pearson, „post-modern rhetorical theory offers a powerful 
and cogent theory with which to conceptualise public relations theory and business ethics‟ (1989, p.121). 
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According to this view all truths, including moral truths, emerge out of a process of negotiation and 
debate. There are no objective standards of right and wrong only subjective views on what constitutes 
right and wrong. Moral rules are intersubjective in that they are arrived at through agreement between 
different subjective viewpoints. Pearson argues that this communication process is the key to business 
ethics for it is in this process „that the moral truths shaping corporate conduct are grounded‟ (p.122). 
According to Pearson this approach offers equity, that is, the decision as to what actions are ethical 
emerges through the communicative interaction of all sides. This depends on accepting that public 
relations, insofar as it plays „the central role in corporate communication‟ also „plays the major role in 
managing the moral dimension of corporate conduct‟ (p.111). Pearson here seems to be advocating a 
conception of public relations practice similar to by Grunig and Hunt‟s (1984) two-way symmetrical 
model.  
Whilst a theory of public relations which emphasises the centrality of dialogue seems attractive it 
should be pointed out that there are several issues here which need to be resolved. Firstly, the issue of 
„power‟ seems to be largely ignored. It might be possible to think of a situation where all relevant groups 
are represented regarding an issue but it is difficult to imagine a situation where all the participants will 
be accorded equal status. There is an additional problem in that a process of dialogue has to stop 
somewhere and a resolution to which everyone agrees might not be possible. A decision might have to 
made which is only in the interests of the majority and it is hard to see how one could prevent this from 
collapsing into utilitarianism, where you rely on maximising happiness for the greatest possible number. 
Pearson‟s cultural relativism suffers from the major stumbling block that all parties must agree 
that all actors involved in an issue are equal. Based on this foundational assumption all parties can then 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory outcome through dialogue. However by insisting on this concept of 
equality it seems that Pearson is actually insisting on something similar to the notion that all human 
beings have „rights‟ or that everyone should be treated as an end, not merely as a means. These 
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assumptions do not emerge out of the process of symmetrical dialogue; they are a prerequisite for it. By 
relying on these cognitivist ethical doctrines to guarantee his model Pearson has ended up in a rather 
awkward and contradictory position for it is precisely these approaches which he wished to replace with 
the „post-modern rhetorical theory‟ he enthusiastically advocates throughout his text.   
Up until now we have reviewed key approaches regarding how to think about ethical issues. The 
rest of this chapter will now focus on the implications of these ethical theories for public relations, and 
more specifically, on what have they have to do with corporate social responsibility. One thing that is 
immediately apparent is that even a brief survey of the literature explaining most corporate social 
responsibility programmes reveals that the language and concepts we have just discussed - the „common 
good‟, „rights‟, „duty‟ and „responsibility‟ - are all terms which have been used in describing or justifying 
this activity.  
  
SHOULD BUSINESS BE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE? 
 
In this section two contrasting views of corporate social responsibility will be discussed. In some 
senses they represent the extreme poles of opinion on this issue. In practice the attitude of most 
companies to corporate social responsibility will occupy a position somewhere between the two. Ethical 
doctrines play a role in justifying both perspectives. For example, Friedman, who rejects any conception 
of corporate social responsibility, justifies his „free-market approach‟ from a utilitarian standpoint. On the 
other side of the debate corporate social responsibility is viewed as a necessary and integral part of the 
„stakeholder approach‟, an approach which is ultimately justified from a Kantian perspective. 
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The social responsibility of business is to increase profits 
 Milton Friedman, the economist and advocate of laissez-faire capitalism, argued against the idea 
that business has a social responsibility in the sense outlined above. He claimed that „there is one and 
only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits‟ (Friedman, 1993, p. 254). Friedman insists that it is wrong to suggest that 
corporations can have social responsibilities, since for him, only individuals can have responsibilities. He 
claims that the actual responsibilities of the corporate executive should be narrowly defined. He writes: 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the 
business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in 
accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom (Friedman, 1993, p.249). 
 
By claiming that businesses have only one social responsibility, to maximise their profits, Friedman is in 
effect saying they have no social responsibilities in the generally accepted sense of the term. He does not 
say that moral rules have no place in relation to business practice, in fact while pursuing profits business 
must conform to what he refers to as „ethical custom‟. As Chryssides and Kaler (1993) point out he 
seems to be making a distinction between first and second order ethical rules, the basic moral rules of 
society (the first order) and social responsibility precepts (an optional second order). He does not 
elaborate on what the rules based on ethical custom are, but he does give some indication as to what the 
second order rules might involve. For instance Friedman (1993) castigates businessmen for „preaching 
pure and unadulterated socialism‟ when they speak of „responsibilities for providing employment, 
eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the 
contemporary crop of reformers‟ (p.249).  
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According to Friedman those who „preach‟ the doctrine of social responsibility are making two 
claims both of which he disagrees with. These are, firstly that business must actively seek to do good 
(that is, not just avoid transgressing „ethical custom‟). Secondly, this „good‟ must not be done for profit, 
that is, it must not be done with self-interest in mind (if this was the motivation Friedman would have no 
objection to it). This raises and important question, which is, is actively seeking to do good easily 
distinguishable from the mere avoidance of doing evil? Friedman seems to believe it is but it is difficult 
to see how the examples that he points to demonstrate this. It could be argued that some of the examples 
he lists, „eliminating discrimination‟ or „avoiding pollution‟ are doing „good‟, but at the same time they 
are actions which are engaged in getting rid of or avoiding what most people would perceive to be social 
evils. What Friedman‟s own examples illustrate is that on many occasions the moral choice is between 
doing good or, by default, doing evil. Chryssides and Kaler (1993) note: 
 Friedman‟s assumption of a neat division between „ethical custom‟ and  business social 
responsibility takes too narrow a view of both. The first  cannot be confined to simply the passive 
avoidance of evil or the  second to just the active pursuit of good because very often good and 
 evil are simply two sides of the same moral coin. Friedman is therefore  wrong to assume that 
acceptance of „ethical custom‟ has no implication  for the adoption of socially responsible policies by 
business. Clearly it  has; if only because such is the power of business over people‟s lives  that its 
failure to do good will very often result in great evils being  permitted to flourish (p. 232). 
         
 It is not only Friedman‟s definition of corporate social responsibility which is flawed, there are 
also problems with the arguments he presents against corporate social responsibility. One of his key 
arguments, sometimes referred to as „the agency argument‟ (Chryssides and Kaler, 1993, p. 234), is that 
managers of corporations are merely agents of the shareholders in the companies they work for. The 
owners of businesses, the shareholders, are the only people to which managers are accountable and the 
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only responsibility managers have is to act in their interests. This means maximising profits so that the 
shareholder will make as much money as possible from their shares. Friedman presents his premise about 
a manager‟s role vis-à-vis the shareholders as a „statement of legal fact‟ (Chryssides and Kaler, 1993, p. 
234). While other interests may be taken into account,
viii
 Friedman is largely correct in stating that the 
managers of a corporation must ultimately serve the interests of the shareholders. However, in British and 
US law the corporation is a separate legal entity and is not identified solely with any particular group - 
employees, shareholders or directors. It is precisely this issue of „legal identification‟ which 
incorporation is meant to resolve. This means that whilst employees, shareholders and directors may, and 
do, change, the corporation carries on as the identifiable possessor of legal rights and duties. Chryssides 
and Kaler (1993) note that: 
[B]ecause they are employed by the company rather than its shareholders, changes in shareholding do 
not, of themselves, affect the legal position of employees, be they managers or workers, they continue to 
be employed by the same company. In an important respect, changes in shareholding do not even affect 
ownership. It is the company as a corporate entity which owns the assets of the business. What the 
shareholders own is a right to a share of any distributable financial surplus. They in effect own the 
company rather than its assets. Consequently, the right of the company, acting through its employees, to 
utilize those assets is legally unaffected by changes in shareholding (p. 229).    
 
Managers therefore are not directly the agents of the shareholders in the way that Friedman wishes to 
imply, although, shareholders are, in roundabout way, the owners of the business. Friedman‟s assertion 
that the interests of the corporation ought to be exclusively identified with its shareholders must be seen 
in the context of his advocacy of the values of free enterprise. These values involve a combination of 
ethical egoism and classical utilitarianism, a view that claims that if everyone pursues their own self-
interest within a free market, the result is the greatest happiness, or economic well being, for the greatest 
number of actors within that market. This argument that only the interests of shareholders are important is 
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not universally agreed. There is, in fact, an argument that the managers should act as the agents of all 
groups associated with the corporation and not just the shareholders. Those who support this view reject 
Friedman‟s „stockholder‟ model in favour of what usually referred to as the „stakeholder‟ model. 
 
Kantian capitalism and the stakeholder approach        
          The „stakeholder‟ model is so named because those who propose it argue that the task of the 
corporate manager is to balance the interests of all the different groups who have a „stake‟ in the 
company. These groups might include shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, the local 
community and even broader society. The interests of the shareholders in increasing their profits is only 
one interest amongst many that the management must consider. This model requires the corporation to 
take account of its social responsibilities. Evan and Freeman (1993) argue from a Kantian perspective for 
adoption of the stakeholder model. They utilise Kant‟s categorical imperative to argue that all human 
beings have a right not to be treated as merely a means but as an end in themselves. Corporate policy 
must consider all of its stakeholders. They go on to argue that all affected groups should actually have a 
role in determining company policy. Evan and Freeman (1993) state their belief in a Kantian ethical 
doctrine explicitly: 
We can revitalize the concept of managerial capitalism by replacing the notion that managers have a duty 
to stockholders with the concept that managers bear a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders. Stakeholders 
are those groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm. Specifically we include suppliers, customers, 
employees, stockholders and the local community, as well as management in its role as agent for these 
groups. We argue that the legal, economic, political, and moral challenges to the currently received theory 
of the firm, as a nexus of contracts among the owners of the factors of production and customers, require 
us to revise this concept along essentially Kantian lines. That is, each of these stakeholder groups has a 
right not to be treated as a means to some end, and therefore must participate in determining the future 
direction of the firm in which they have a stake (p. 255). 
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They argue that, in the US, changes in the legal system have been progressively circumscribing the idea 
that the corporation is only run in the interests of the „stockholders‟. They point to a number of legal 
cases in the US which show that although stockholders‟ interests are still paramount, other interests, 
customers, suppliers, local communities and employees have increasingly secured protection under the 
law (Evan and Freeman, 1993, p.255-57). Friedman‟s viewpoint, they would argue, is slowly being 
overtaken by changes - in business thinking and legislation - more in line with a stakeholder approach. 
 In the stakeholder model the corporation co-ordinates stakeholder interests. It is through the 
corporation that each stakeholder group makes itself better off through voluntary exchanges. They argue 
that the „corporation serves at the pleasure of its stakeholders, and none may be used as a means to the 
ends of another without full rights of participation in that decision‟ (p.262). From the stakeholder 
perspective corporate social responsibility is not an optional extra. It is integral to the responsibilities of 
the company and the company must pay as much attention to its social duties as it does to maximising 
profits. 
 
THE PRACTICE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
This section will analyse the practice of corporate social responsibility by examining the language public 
relations specialists use to explain corporate social responsibility programmes and suggest that they tend to rely 
upon the language of the classic ethical theories to do so. Firstly, however, it is important to locate the role of 
public relations within the practice of social responsibility. When business organisations decide to involve 
themselves in local community initiatives there is usually an attempt to construct a narrative to explain why they 
are doing what they are doing. This task of explanation is usually allocated to the company‟s public relations 
department. This is hardly surprising since public relations specialists tend to play a key role in setting up 
corporate social responsibility programmes in the first place. 
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Public relations and corporate social responsibility 
 
„Come & See‟ is very much a PR initiative - the question is, does PR stand for Public Relations 
here, or Propaganda Really? The message is that nuclear power . . . is clean and green . . . that 
radiation has always been around and is natural . . . also that nuclear power is safe. . . I‟d heard 
that word „safe‟ used a lot, and it was beginning to acquire a kind of Orwellian charm (Scotland 
on Sunday Magazine, quoted in Tilson, 1993, p.432). 
  
The practice of corporate social responsibility is usually regarded as a public relations function because 
this is where the company meets the public outside of the usual roles of producers (or service providers) 
and customers. There is however another key reason why public relations specialists have tended to be 
associated with corporate social responsibility, namely, the claim that public relations can be a 
mechanism within liberal, pluralist society to enable the realisation of „laudible social goals‟ (Gandy, 
1992, p.133).  
For J.A. Pimlot (1951) the historian of public relations in the US, public relations is intricately 
connected with what he views as democratic ideals. He writes: „They [the public relations specialists] are 
experts in popularizing information . . . the better the job of popularization, the more smoothly will 
society function‟ (quoted in Pearson, 1992, p.257). Heath (1992) argues that „professional 
communicators have a major voice in the marketplace of ideas‟ but that ultimately these voices „compete 
to achieve cooperation - the collective and coordinated actions of people in society‟ (p.20). Cutlip et al. 
(1995) go further and argue that public relations practitioners „must operate as moral agents in society‟ 
and they must be prepared to place „public service and social responsibility over personal gains and 
special private interests‟ (p.134). 
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These claims that public relations is concerned with the public interest are in part a reaction to the 
kinds of remarks noted above - that PR stands for „propaganda really‟ - about the visitor centre at 
Scottish Nuclear plc. However, it is also clear that there is a significant strand within public relations 
theorising which claims that its practice can have a positive contribution within society, although this 
usually comes with the proviso that practice needs to be transformed (Grunig, 1989). It almost goes 
without saying that there is bound to be a tension between this conception of public relations serving the 
interests of society and the requirement that it serves the interests of the corporation. This tension 
between responsibility to the needs of the company and responsibility to the needs of society is 
sometimes revealed by the language used in corporate documents which attempt to explain the practice of 
corporate social responsibility. 
 
The language of corporate social responsibility 
Companies frequently justify corporate social responsibility programmes by referring to the 
notion of „enlightened self-interest‟. For example, community programmes may be justified with the 
utilitarian argument that „everyone benefits‟. The company‟s image is enhanced and a local community 
materially benefited. Neil Shaw, chairman of Tate & Lyle plc. explains the mutual benefits of community 
programmes: 
Our community activities, both in the UK and abroad, focus particularly on initiatives in the 
localities of our plants and the provision of direct assistance for individuals seeking further 
educational attainment. In addition, we also encourage secondment of employees to particular 
projects in the belief that, not only can this make a worthwhile contribution to community 
activities, but in doing so, the experience will enable volunteers to develop their own management 
potential (Newman, 1995, p.99). 
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 L‟Etang (1996) notes that while corporate social responsibility programmes are indeed justified 
on utilitarian grounds there seems to be little attempt to actually evaluate and quantify the effect of such 
programmes. She points out that if such evaluation is lacking then companies „will not be in a position to 
claim that they have contributed to happiness. In short, corporate social responsibility justified on 
utilitarian grounds needs to demonstrate cost-benefit analysis from the perspectives of donor, recipient 
and society in general‟ (p.92). 
 We will return to this issue of evaluating the effects of corporate social responsibility programmes 
however it should be noted that it is also the case that information which public relations departments 
supply frequently alludes, in Kantian language, to its responsibilities or duties to the community, or 
society as a whole. Lord Raynor, Chairman of Marks and Spenser states: „There rests on all companies, 
particularly large organisations like ours, a responsibility to assist through donations and help, the 
charities and agencies which exist in the community‟ (quoted in L‟Etang, 1996, p.91). L‟Etang (1996) 
notes that such claims are seldom matched by the practice of corporations. She argues that a Kantian 
approach to corporate social responsibility would focus on the motivation behind the programme, 
because seeking benefit from carrying out your responsibilities would not be ethical. From this 
perspective a corporate social responsibility programme needs to demonstrate that it is motivated by duty, 
and not self-interest (enlightened or any other kind). If a company were attempting to improve its image 
via community involvement then it would be treating beneficiaries as a means and not as ends in 
themselves and thus breaking Kant‟s categorical imperative. L‟Etang (1996) points out that if 
corporations took on board Kantian principles then their corporate social responsibility programmes 
might be managed rather differently. If the beneficiaries of corporate social responsibility are to be 
treated as ends in themselves then they should be accorded equal status in defining the relationship 
between the corporation and themselves (p. 93). If the language of the classic ethical theories is adopted 
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to explain and justify corporate social responsibility but companies do not to fulfil the full implications of 
these ethical doctrines then they can leave themselves open to the charge of cynicism.  
 A further problem is that companies do not restrict themselves to justifying corporate social 
responsibility solely from a utilitarian, or a Kantian perspective. Robert Clarke, Chairman of United 
Biscuits, states: „Our commitment to community involvement stems from our strong sense of social 
responsibility combined with the realization of the commercial benefits that it brings . . . a generous and 
far-reaching sense of community responsibility - are essential to effective long-term business 
performance‟ (Newman, 1995, p.99). L‟Etang notes that in „many cases corporate literature is confusing 
because it appears to appeal to both utilitarian and Kantian principles yet apparently delivers on neither‟ 
(L‟Etang, 1996, p.93). This point, while indisputable, can perhaps be explained to some extent by the 
fact, noted above, that the classic ethical doctrines need to be qualified by each other in order to arrive at 
an ethic which balances rights and obligations with the „greater good‟. It could certainly be argued that 
given that moral philosophers have found it difficult to come to any kind of satisfactory resolution when 
debating the relative merits of these ethical doctrines it would be asking a lot to expect business managers 
or public relations practitioners to do so. However, I would suggest that there may be another reason for 
the appeal to different ethical doctrines and this is the recognition that corporate discourse has many 
different audiences. Whether the public relations specialist, in recognising this and exploiting it, is 
displaying realism or cynicism is an issue worthy of serious debate.  
The following case study of Telewest Communications plc. is an example of a corporate donor 
justifying their corporate social responsibility programme in different ways, to different audiences. 
 
Case Study: The ‘discourses’ of corporate social responsibility - Telewest Communications plc. 
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The Public Relations Department of Telewest Communications plc. in their „Community 
information pack„ix (available 1996-7), states that „Telewest‟s most significant contribution to local 
communities is through its educational initiative - Cable in the Classroom‟. In the pack Telewest point 
out that they are working with Local Authorities to provide multi-channel cable television services and 
interactive internet access to all schools within the Telewest franchise areas. The community information 
pack does not discuss corporate social responsibility explicitly, but implicitly there is a message 
throughout the pack to the effect that Telewest are fulfilling their duty or responsibility to local 
communities by helping out in this way.  
 Obviously this kind of project requires significant level of expenditure and the company‟s 1997 
Annual Report had to explain „Cable in the Classroom‟ to the shareholders. The project is discussed in 
the section entitled Building stronger relationships with customers and here more utilitarian language is 
used to explain the benefits of the project for the community and the company. The Annual Report states: 
„Our activity in local communities extends beyond the construction and marketing phase and is best 
evidenced by our involvement with schools and colleges‟. Regarding the decision to offer these services 
to local communities the report notes: „The offer has helped us to develop a positive role in the 
community, and to enhance awareness of our product with future customers‟. It later adds: „The decision 
has received strong endorsement within educational, political and regulatory circles and will further 
strengthen our position in the communities we serve‟. The key point here is that the same corporate social 
responsibility programme can be explained or justified in different ways, using different language, 
depending upon the expectations of the audience. If the „utilitarian‟ explanation used in the annual report 
had been used in the community information pack the media coverage of the initiative may well have 
focused on the phrase „enhance awareness of our product with future customers‟ and the programme 
might well have been portrayed as a cynical exercise in product placement. If the annual report had 
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merely contained an explanation of the project and the expected benefits for the community, shareholders 
may well have asked what the benefit of all this expenditure was to Telewest and ultimately to them.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 With regard to the role of public relations in corporate social responsibility, there would appear to 
be two choices. Public relations practitioners can use corporate social responsibility as just another 
element in the „the creation, or “engineering” of consent‟ in order to foster „a favourable and positive 
climate of opinion toward the . . . institution‟ (Steinberg, 1975, p.15 quoted in Gandy, 1992, p.133). Or 
they could try to realise the idea that public relations can act in the public interest (Grunig, 1989, Cutlip, 
et al.) by making genuine attempts to discover the requirements of community stakeholders and help 
companies be more responsive to social needs. To achieve the latter the stakeholder model, built as it is 
upon deontological foundational assumptions, is a prerequisite. This model argues that a corporation 
should be run in the interests of all the groups which have a stake in it. In respect to corporate social 
responsibility programmes it would mean that all stakeholder groups including the potential beneficiaries 
of such programmes should contribute to the decision-making process. This would demonstrate that 
companies are treating the beneficiaries of corporate social responsibility with „good will‟ and as ends in 
themselves. Portway (1995) makes the point that there should be a requirement to track the company‟s 
performance in a way that can be reported to its community stakeholders. This kind of measurement and 
evaluation can then take its place „in managing stakeholder relationships alongside customer satisfaction 
programmes and employee opinion surveys‟ (p. 229).  
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When they first formulated it in 1988
x
 Evan and Freeman admitted that a stakeholder approach 
may seem „utopian‟ (1993, p. 265), but it would appear that more recently the tide has turned to an extent 
and the stakeholder concept has infiltrated business and political thinking to a remarkable degree. In 
regard to this issue of changing attitudes toward CSR it is worth noting claims made in the aftermath of 
the September 11
th
 tragedy which appear to reflect this rise to prominence of CSR as a business ethics 
concept. In a report Response Consulting
xi
 suggested that; „With the rise . . . of . . . greater feelings of 
wanting to be part of a community (particularly evident in the wake of September 11
th
), companies can 
no longer afford to ignore the issues at the heart of corporate social responsibility‟. Another report by 
ECHO The Communications Research Group
xii
 based on research carried out at the ICCO Global 
Summit Conference (November 2001) with company CEO‟s argued that; „There are indications that CSR 
is increasingly becoming expected of organisations, rather than a pleasing added extra. This change 
appears to be externally driven, i.e. organisations responding to stakeholder expectations, and is predicted 
to be given renewed impetus by the events of September 11
th‟. They conclude „that a significant 
proportion of ICCO delegates felt that organisations themselves will attach more importance to CSR 
post-September 11
th‟. It remains to be seen whether the emotions raised by September 11th help make a 
transition to a more caring corporate society, as these optimistic predictions suggest or whether the event 
will become little more than another tragic historical footnote. What is clear is that until all business 
audiences are convinced that corporate social responsibility is more than just self-interest, public 
relations departments will continue to use different explanations, based on different ethical doctrines, to 
justify corporate social responsibility to their different audiences.   
 
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 
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1. What are the key strengths and limitations for business ethics and public relations practice of the 
utilitarian, deontological and human rights ethical doctrines? 
2. Does „postmodern rhetorical theory‟ offer a useful way of conceptualising the role of public relations 
in relation to ethical disputes? 
3. What are the key distinctions between a „stockholder‟ and a „stakeholder‟ model of modern 
capitalism? 
4. When public relations practitioners employ different ethical doctrines to justify corporate social 
responsibility programmes to their different audiences is it fair to accuse them of cynicism? 
5. Chose a company and examine the documentation which outlines and explains its corporate social 
responsibility programme(s). The company website may contain different kinds of texts, not 
necessarily all aimed at the same audience or public, press releases, webpages devoted to corporate 
social responsibility involvement and corporate annual reports.  Analyse these texts to see if there is 
any difference in the way they explain and justify corporate responsibility programmes. Does the 
ethical language change depending on the text and can you identify its possible audience(s)?   
 
                                                 
i
 Similarly the term moral is derived from the Latin mores meaning customs or habits. 
ii
 There is of course also „critical‟ or „meta-ethical thinking which is concerned with such questions as: What is the 
meaning or use of the expressions “(morally) right” or “good”? How can ethical and value judgements be 
established or justified?  
iii
For a comprehensive explanation of this terminolgy and a discussion of perspectives and issues relating to 
business ethics see Chryssides and Kaler (1993).   
iv
This discussion does not assess the impact of religious morality which obviously has a profound influence upon 
business ethics in many cultures and upon a significant number of people in our own culture. The theory that 
certain actions are right because God commands them - for example, in the Bible, the Qur‟an or the Torah - is 
sometimes known as the Divine Command theory (Chryssides and Kaler, 1993, p. 84). Occasionally in 
discussions surrounding issues of corporate social responsibility it is asserted that certain groups such as the 
Quakers displayed an altruistic approach in their business dealings and help to local communities. L‟Etang (1996, 
p.84) notes that there is a confusion here between „philanthropy‟ and „social responsibility‟. I would agree but 
would add that there also seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding of what motivates such religious groups 
who act in the way they do because certain kinds of behaviour, toward employees and society, are prescribed in 
the Bible.  
v
 Some authors refer to consequentionalist theories as „telelogical‟ (Day, Dong and Robins, 2001). These authors, 
amongst others (e.g. Curtin and Boynton, 2001) discuss the concept of „situational ethics‟ as a way of resolving 
the shortcomings of the classic ethical doctrines but it is difficult to see how one can prevent this approach from 
slipping into ethical relativism.  
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vi
To suggest that we can measure happiness seems rather unrealistic but it could be argued that the discipline of 
economics „has attempted, indirectly, to introduce an element of quantification in that consumption of goods and 
services is said to satisfy wants‟ (Chryssides and Kaler, 1993, p.92). It is certainly the case that economics and 
utilitarian ethical theory have a long historical connection and there is a degree of conceptual and terminological 
overlap. For example Chryssides and Kaler (1993) note that „in economics the capacity in goods and services to 
provide satisfaction is spoken of as their utility‟ (p.93). 
vii
 In an early work Kant stated that he disallowed all lying. Some commentators argue that this view was qualified 
in his later work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. For a fuller discussion of this point see Chryssides and 
Kaler (1993, p. 100). 
viii
 Interestingly the 1980 Companies Act permits British company directors to have regard to the interest of 
employees, but this is an option they are legally free to exercise rather than a duty which has to be fulfilled (see 
Chryssides and Kaler, 1993, p. 234). 
ix
The „community information pack‟ was sent to anyone in the franchise are who requested it, individuals, schools 
and local press and community groups. There was very little explanation of the kinds of cable services which 
Telewest would be supplying. There was a great deal of information about the impact on the environment of 
installing cable and the general possibilities of the cable technology for business, education etc. 
x
 Evan and Freeman were the first authors to explicitly outline a stakeholder theory of the firm in their 1988 article 
„A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism.‟ In Ethical Theory and Business. T.L. 
Beaucamp and N.E. Bowie, (Eds.) Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
xi
 http://www.response-website.com 
xii
 http://www.corporate-financial.com/pdf/CorporateCitizenshipReport.pdf 
